Annapolis Watch (an occasional feature here)

Just a month ago, on 27 November, despite almost universal predictions of failure, Condi Rice managed to stage a high-level international meeting (which she insisted on dubbing a summit), whose sole accomplishment was setting a process in motion. Early this week, as part of this process, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators met in Jerusalem in a very forgettable session, marked only by vociferous Palestinian complaints of newly announced Israeli construction in the contentious Har Homa/Jebel abu Gnehm neighborhood/settlement of Jerusalem, matched by Israeli complaints of alleged Palestinian security failures.

PM Olmert, the master politician, has now attempted to manage this problem and will likely succeed, though in a manner that does not bode well for any serious peace agreement. He has given credibility to the leaked reports that the ill-timed Har Homa building tenders were the result of Israeli bureaucratic timing rather than high-level attempts at humiliating Abu Mazen, though settler-oriented forces in the housing ministry might well have nudged the responsible bureaucrats. In any case, Olmert chose, in classic political, even Solomonic, fashion, to split the baby; declaring that the Har Homa construction will go forward but that any further Jewish building in East Jerusalem will be carefully scrutinized to be sure it does not “hamper” the peace process.

Secretary Rice will probably give this her blessing, and Abu Mazen will have to accept it. However, it is a perfect illustration of why the Annapolis Process is unlikely to succeed.

Olmert, had he been a statesman rather than primarily a politician, might have used the occasion to make an issue of existing government decisions that imperil negotiations. Admittedly, this would have been difficult, as it might have required a cabinet vote. Instead, he took the easy, if clever, route and compromised between peace and settlements, but at the cost of further humiliating Abu Mazen to his people and to the Arab League.

If the Annapolis Process is to have any chance of success before 20 January 2009, Olmert will have to openly confront some significant Israeli shibboleths on settlements, borders and Jerusalem, and probably others as well. Perhaps he is biding his time, and gathering his strength. But there is precious little evidence of this, nor do the forces that would ferociously oppose such changes seem to be particularly worried.

We will see shortly whether Olmert’s post-Solomonic wisdom has moved the process on, so that the next meeting may be more substantive. Abu Mazen’s credibility has taken so many hits that this additional one is unlikely to be fatal. But sooner rather than later there will be a need for hard decisions, and we still do not see good reason to believe that Olmert the compromising politician can swing a cudgel at his enemies when the occasion requires.

Paul Scham